Nuclear Posture Report Review - Post #8

This post is part of a series that I continue to write about the NPR report issued by the Obama administration. You can download the report here. This post will deal with both the "Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners" and "Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal" chapters of the NPR. Standard disclaimer:  I am employed by Sandia National Laboratories. The views written here are not the official position of SNL and should not be viewed that way. They are my views as a private citizen.

The "Strengthening Regional..." chapter (pages 31-36) did not cause me much difficulty or tension as I read it.  I did get "worried" in this chapter when the administration claims that, "we will work closely with our allies."  I have seen too much arrogance (?), contempt (?), or something else from Obama toward our traditional allies like the United Kingdom and Israel to believe that there is much behind the words.

The "Sustaining a Safe..." chapter (pages 37-44) is essentially a three decade look ahead put out by the administration.  In this look ahead, the NPR realizes that every stockpile weapon will require some degree of technical attention.  Until a few months ago when the administration released the number of weapons in our stockpile, the specific number and type of warheads were classified (Secret Restricted Data - Sigma  5).  The administration did not release the type of warheads, so I will assume that the information is still classified.  The "transparency" with respect to classified information really chaps me.  I am not claiming that the President didn't have the authority to release the information (both the President and Vice President have this power), but I do not believe that it is smart to start revealing this type of data.

Continuing with the chapter, on page 39, the administration details a plan that we will not produce any new warheads.  Instead, we will continue our practice of Life Extension Programs (LEP).  In addition, the administration has declared that we will have no new designs of nuclear components, no new missions for nuclear weapons, and no new capabilities in the nuclear stockpile. I don't like the outlook here, but this is consistent with maintaining the stockpile for defensive purposes only. One positive that comes out of this section is that all options (the refurbishment of current weapons, the reuse of nuclear components for different warheads, and the replacement of nuclear components for different warheards) are on the table for future LEPs. However, a strong preference for refurbishment and/or reuse was voiced in this NPR.

There is a section starting on page 40 called "Critical Infrastructure and Human Capital."  The irony of this section is that you need highly educated, trained, and experience personnel to maintain the nuclear stockpile while these needed scientists/engineers are not going to be interested in the fact that the NNSA has declared that we will do nothing new.  You don't spend most of your life training for an R&D job, and then decide you are going to work as a "caretaker" for someone else's project.  The goal of no new design work and maintaining capabilities work against each other.  On a very personal note, pages 40-41 are basically a job security outline for me.

Nuclear Posture Report Review - Post #7

This post is part of a series that I continue to write about the NPR report issued by the Obama administration. You can download the report here. This post will deal with the "Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels" chapter of the NPR. Once again, before I continue commenting on the NPR, I need to add a disclaimer. I am employed by Sandia National Laboratories. The views written here are not the official position of SNL and should not be viewed that way. They are my views as a private citizen.

This chapter seems to be about leaving a legacy for President Obama.  The administration is outlining its plan for a START treaty that will limit the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia.  Amazingly, China is omitted from these treaty discussions.  Getting into the details on the planned New START reduction, there is a statement on page 22 that I simply do not understand, "Single-warhead ICBMs contribute to stability ..."  This statement is followed up with the "DeMIRVed" ICBM force.  Someone in the State Department believes that de-MIRVing reduces the incentive to strike first.  This is a silly statement because the U.S. has maintained for as long as I have been alive that our ICBM capabilities are strictly a deterrent capability.

This chapter continues to support the idea of a nuclear triad which a positive.  In addition, I found a lot of positives in seeking to be able to move treaty allowed weapons and delivery platforms as long as the flexibility to move them back to the original platform is maintained.  The current alert posture for our nuclear forces is maintained (page 25) and I see this as a step forward.

On page 25, we find that we will maintain our policy of "Open Ocean Targeting" of our strategic weapons.  I think that this policy is a meaningless exercise, but it does maintain the appearance of good faith in strategic deterrence.  Also on page 25, we find that we will seek to "Maximize the decision time for the President."  This is really silly because the President has the sole authority for the release of a nuclear weapon, so he can take all the time he needs.

Moving to non-strategic weapons (pages 27-28), I am encouraged by the decision to do a full scope life extension program (LEP) for the B-61, but I think the retirement of the sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) is a bad decision.  This decision assumes that bombers with B-61 or air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM-N) overlap the TLAM-N capability.

On page 30, I find a lot in the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program that is good.  However, it will require significant $$$$ to actually perform the tasks and complete the goals. In reality, the true method of reducing the number of non-deployed weapons is TESTING.  Resumption of testing is NOT going to happen until the Directors at the NNSA national laboratories (Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore) will not sign the annual assurance letter to the President.  In my opinion, this action is well into the future.

Nuclear Posture Report Review - Post #6

This post is part of a series that I continue to write about the NPR report issued by the Obama administration. You can download the report here. This post will deal with the "Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons" chapter of the NPR. Once again, before I continue commenting on the NPR, I need to add a disclaimer. I am employed by Sandia National Laboratories. The views written here are not the official position of SNL and should not be viewed that way. They are my views as a private citizen.

I have mentioned it before but this chapter is the one in which the Obama administration details that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against any nation that is in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  This stance is taken even if we are attacked by Chemical and/or Biological Weapons (CBW).   Here is a re-publish of my original take on this:

• ...the U.S. gave up its chemical and biological weapons by treaty a long time ago, so we can't retaliate "tit for tat" with this type of weapon. The research that we do in this area is limited to the development of protective suits for our soldiers and the development of agents to deactivate or decontaminate the chem-bio agents.  In the past, we have used the unknown and ambiguous nature of our response to these types of attacks against us as a deterrent. We are now proclaiming that, as long as you are in compliance with the non-proliferation treaty, we will not retaliate with nuclear weapons even if you choose to attack us with biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. I can't believe that I am the only one that thinks this is completely asinine and stupid.
• Our soldiers went into Kuwait to expel Iraqi forces during the Gulf War wearing chem-bio protection because every one in the world KNEW that Saddam Hussein had those weapons.  Was he hesitant to use them because he was a great humanitarian?  We know that the answer to that is "NO!" because he attacked the Kurds in northern Iraq (his own people) with them in 1988. I think that he did not want his Presidential palace illuminated with a W80 warhead mounted on the front end of a Tomahawk cruise missile.  If he had chosen to use these WMDs, he knew that was one of our possible responses. With this new NPR, he would not have had those fears.

As I went through this, I realized I have discussed this chapter in depth (basically in posts #1 and #2).  To conclude my thoughts on this chapter, it seems that the entire section is devoted to demonstrating how "nice" the U.S. wants to be.  This does nothing except project weakness around the world.  It also makes increasingly cheaper and deadlier biological weapons MORE likely. Countries will be very sure that they are in compliance with all aspects of the NPT when they decide to use Chem-Bio Weapons against the U.S.

Nuclear Posture Report Review - Post #5

This post is part of a series that I continue to write about the NPR report issued by the Obama administration. You can download the report here. This post will deal with the "Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism" chapter of the NPR. Once again, before I continue commenting on the NPR, I need to add a disclaimer. I am employed by Sandia National Laboratories. The views written here are not the official position of SNL and should not be viewed that way. They are my views as a private citizen.

As I continued to read through this document, I found that I am getting more increasingly frustrated at the tone of the Obama administration.  Am I the only person that thinks that this administration uses the phrase, "For the first time" more than is reasonable?  As you finish the 1st paragraph of the chapter (page 9), you will see the claim that we have placed non-proliferation and preventing nuclear terrorism at the top of our list of things to do "for the first time."  While the priority may not have appeared explicitly in the previous NPRs, it is ridiculous to say that we have not placed the highest priority on securing loose nukes and nuclear materials since the fall of the Soviet Union.  We have even worked with the Russian Federation to do just that since the early 1990's.

On page 10, there is the statement that we are "identifying and prosecuting its [international terror] networks and establishing international standards and best practices."  I circled the sentence and wrote one word, "HA!"  This section gave me a chuckle because the Obama administration still believes that fighting terrorism is a law enforcement activity.  This is one of the flaws that the 9/11 Commission noted in its final report.  The terrorists are at war with us and some still think that it is a matter of identifying and prosecuting crime.

On page 11 (second bullet), we find that the U.S. hosted a "Nuclear Security Summit" in April 2010.  That is typical of the Obama administration:

• Get together
• Talk for a day or two
• Declare agreement
• Praise the work done.

If you remember, Israel refused to attend because of the implications of the pre-determined outcome.  There was a lot of positive press coverage over this nothing Summit, but the "agreement" reached will have no lasting impact on international non-proliferation activities.

One of the most disturbing aspects of this chapter is found on page 12 (second bullet), where the NPR declares that we will strengthen our nuclear forensics efforts.  In some circles, this activity is referred to as attribution.  This is a give-up statement that declares "What we are going to do is going to fail, but we will be able to identify those responsible for nuking us."  That scares the hell out of me.

The 3rd bullet on page 12 is ironic to me.  It states that we will hold fully accountable any ... that helps nuclear activities against the U.S. However, we state previously in the NPR, that have taken nuclear weapons off the table for those that are in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It seems to me that a country could aid terrorists in attacking us with nuclear and/or radiological weapons while maintaining compliance with the NPT.

On page 13 (first bullet), we find that the Obama administration is going to pursue another failed Clinton administration policy, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  In addition, the administration is going to try to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).  The details of these two treaties are not fleshed out enough right now to outline my specific objections.  However, with the track record we have of Obama so far, I doubt that U.S. interests will be protected by this administration in the negotiations of these treaties.

The final comment that I have deals with the final bullet in this chapter.  The progress toward a "world free of nuclear weapons" mentioned there is incredibly NAIVE unless we are talking about developing technology that can and will be used even if the U.S. maintains a nuclear stockpile.

Just a few more of these posts left...